State Terror and Social Control

There are numerous parallels between the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai massacre David Headley and the currently-on-trial face of the 2011 Norway attacks Anders Breivik.  An examination of these parallels suggests there is more than meets the eye with Breivik. …  In his worldview, Muslims are conspiring with European Marxists to create Eurabia, a single European-Arab state populated entirely, or almost entirely, by Muslim Arabs.  He cites numerous examples of ‘Jihad’ and seeks out numerous opportunities in his manifesto to prove how widely read he is on the subject.  And yet, at no point does he even mention the possibility, let alone the reality, of Western covert sponsorship of Islamic radicalism and militancy.  The only references to the CIA in his manifesto are in passing, or to information in the CIA World Fact Book.  The only mentions of the British security services are to MI5’s statistics on the threat from Islamic terrorism.  Despite his obvious knowledge of the media, politics, psychology and psychological warfare and special operations, he appears to have a huge gap in his knowledge when it comes to black and covert operations and the other actions of intelligence and security services.

The styles of the attacks in Mumbai and Oslo/Utoya are also very similar.  While Breivik was supposedly acting alone and Headley sent in a Lashkar-e-Taiba gang to actually carry out the attacks, the results were a prolonged bombing and shooting rampage.  The method of violence, aimed at specific target groups but with the intent to simply kill as many people as possible, is quite rare in the history of terrorism.  Typically, the violence is a means to a political end or aim, whereas this maximum-casualty terrorism is one of the hallmarks of security service involvement.

In essence, the philosophy behind this kind of terrorism is not about causing a particular political reaction, a shift to the Right or to the Left, for or against certain policies.  Instead, the aim is simply to use violence to create fear, and use the fear to justifty greater security.  Among the best examples were the Brabant massacres in Belgium in the 1980s.  Masked gunmen, just like Breivik and the Mumbai shooters, would simply turn up and start shooting people almost at random.  They sometimes stole money from the supermarkets and other locations for their massacres, but this was often found dumped.

Rumours abound about connections between the Nijvel Gang who perpetrated the massacres and various neo-Nazi organisations, and various intelligence services.  What is known is that some of the weapons used in the massacres were stolen from a Belgian Gendarmerie arsenal.  When the Belgian parliament asked its investigative committee to explore the possibility of a link to Gladio, or more broadly to the military and intelligence services, the committee found no such link.

However, this was not for lack of trying.  The Belgian security services were told to co-operate, but clearly didn’t think that was appropriate so they opted instead for a massive cover-up.  The names of those within the local Gladio units SDRA8 and STC/Mob were requested by the inquiry so they could look for possible connections to the Nijvel gang, the Westland New Post and the Front de la Jeunesse.  The security services refused.  The inquiry suggested that the names be revealed to a select panel of three judges, who would only share names with the inquiry if anyone were implicated in the Brabant killings.  The security services refused.  A further suggestion that just the dates of birth of the people in question could be given to the committee was also rejected. …

There is also the wider question of the shift in perceived threat from Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda-inspired Islamic terrorism to white right-wing extremist terrorism, particularly the threat from so-called ‘lone wolves’.  The PST report makes reference to a 2011 threat assessment that preceded Breivik’s massacre that to some extent highlighted the radical Right lashing back against the Islamic immigration and emergence of Islamic hardline or radical groups.

However, it was US intelligence agencies who managed to pre-empt this now perceived shift in threat, over two years before the 22/7 attacks.  An April 2009 Department of Homeland Security assessment titled ‘Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment’ is particularly apt.  You can download a copy here.  It notes:

Despite similarities to the climate of the 1990s, the threat posed by lone wolves and small terrorist cells is more pronounced than in past years. In addition, the historical election of an African American president and the prospect of policy changes are proving to be a driving force for rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization.

It goes on to cite right wing lone wolf terrorists as the major threat to the US …

http://www.investigatingtheterror.com/articles/The_Breivik___Headley_Connections.htm

Thus providing the rationale for mobilizing state security forces against one of the most potent forces for localism (i.e. nationalism), which must be neutralized to make way for the global police state being organized by international finance.  It will be interesting to see how they demonize the other major political brand of localism (i.e. leftist approaches such as community gardens and community currencies).  Will we soon be besieged by the “green thumb brigades” ?  Perhaps explosive pomegranates or strategically placed banana peels will be the next terrorist threat.

Alienating everyone from everyone else presents a difficult problem for the elite given that social connections form so readily in casual encounters between people.  But they’ve already made significant inroads using TV, rage-rap and medical interventions like obstetrical abuse, circumcision and psych drugging.

Drills Gone Live: A strategy for Staging False Flag Terror

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